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The late 1960s and early 1970s have witnessed an unprecedented
boom in both construction and conversion condominiums. The in-
flationary spiral of the 1970s caused many developers of partially-
completed rental projects to seek substantial loan increases to cover
cost overruns.' Such loan increases often could not be justified by
rental income projections. Accordingly, many developers and lend-
ers turned to condominium conversions as a panacea for project cost
overruns. However, with a shortage of end loan money, developers
and lenders were left with unsold "inventory," increasing in cost
with each passing day. Indeed, many developers of condominium
units found themselves in severe financial difficulties, with bank-
ruptcy imminent for some. If the economy continues in its present
state, foreclosures on some condominium projects are inevitable.2
Thus, a prospective condominium purchaser would do well to ask:
What rights does a holder of a sales contract on a condominium unit
have in the event of a foreclosure by the construction lender on the
entire project? It might come as a rude shock for purchasers to learn
that the law provides them with little protection-if any-once they
have waived most of their rights in a condominium sales contract.'
* Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Dwyer
is associated with the firm of Lane & Edson, P.C., Washington, D.C.
1. See generally Note, Missouri Condominium Property Act of 1963, 29
Mo. L. REv. 238, 247 (1964).
2. There will be too few buyers to pay enough to cover builders' costs
and carrying charges.
3. Congress is slowly becoming aware of the magnitude of the plight of
prospective condominium purchasers. On December 5, 1974, Senator
Biden of Delaware stated: "The city of Miami, Fla., which has experienced
expansive growth of condominium development, has also experienced
some of the most complicated problems. At the exotic Emerald Isles West,
many buyers put down a full 25 percent of the purchase price, and received
a promise that they would get 10 percent of it back at closing. Now that
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This article will briefly survey some typical provisions of condomi-
nium sales contracts, and examine various principles of equity for
possible application to condominium foreclosures.
II. The Contractual Setting: Purchaser's Rights Under the
Sales Contract
Condominium sales contracts are seldom identical, and any re-
view of their provisons must entail generalities. Nevertheless, there
are often conditions common to such contracts, which severely limit
the right of purchasers. One frequent provision is that the purchaser
has no right to specific performance, and upon default by the seller
can insist only upon a return of the down payment. Another usual
condition is that the contract not be recorded4 and shall in no way
create a lien or lien right in favor of the purchaser. In addition, the
purchaser usually is required to waive and relinquish any lien right
that may be available to him in law or equity.' The purchaser also
usually agrees that the contract is at all times subject and subordi-
nate to the building loan mortgage and all subsequent loans. Other
provisions may condition performance by the seller upon recorda-
tion of the condominium regime.
Thus, the typical purchaser relinquishes most, if not all rights
under the customary condominium sales contract, other than being
entitled to a return of his good faith deposit in the event the seller
has breached the contract. Even then, a purchaser might never
recover his deposit' if the developer becomes bankrupt.
the development corporation is discussing bankruptcy and already gone
into foreclosure, the buyers, with $1.5 million in deposits at stake, may not
recoup their investment. As Evan Cooper describes in the Miami Herald,
many buyers out of State, are waiting to find out whether they will ever
take title to the apartment or get their deposit back: While the future of
the depositors' money is uncertain, one fact is clear: The emotional and
physical toll on Emerald Isles West buyers has been enormous. As one said:
'I can't believe we have nothing left.'" 120 CONG. REc. 20638 (Dec. 5,
1974).
4. To better safeguard this position, most contracts lack a notarization,
which is needed to record.
5. Such a waiver could affect a possible vendee's lien in state law. See
Crockett, Protecting the Deposit of the 'Consumer' Who Purchases a New
Condominium Apartment, 8 HAWAII B.J. 103, 104 nn.21-23 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Bar Journal].
6. Comment, Legal Protection for Florida Condominium and Coopera-
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In Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo,7 a purchaser (Gulf) deposited
sums in escrow with the seller, an adjudicated bankrupt. The trus-
tee in bankruptcy disaffirmed the sales contract. While the court
ordered a return of the down payment, or so much as could be
traced, the court acknowledged that "with respect to any portion of
the funds which cannot be identified or traced into other property
Gulf must perforce be relegated to proving its claim as a general
creditor against the bankrupt estate."' Moreover, in some states'
the developer can use the deposits in the construction of the build-
ing.10
III. Equitable Remedies Available to the Purchaser
Notwithstanding the legal rights expressly waived by the pur-
chaser in the sales contract, or the rights granted the construction
lender in the mortgage," are there any remedies or relief available
in equity to the purchaser? There is no case law dealing with the
rights of purchasers of condominium units vis-a-vis the construction
lender mortgagee and the borrower-developer. However, the crea-
tion of a condominium regime can be analogized to the traditional
development subdivision of land, 2 with its well-developed body of
tive Buyers and Owners, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 451, 460 (1973).
7. 316 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1963).
8. Id. at 261-62. Maryland, to further protect a purchaser's right to a
return of deposit, requires all deposits for units not completed at the time
of sale to be segregated in a separate escrow account by the seller or
requires a corporate surety bond. MD. ANN. CODE § 10-301 (1974) (Real
Property). Virginia, in its revised condominium act, not only requires de-
posits to be held in escrow, but states that "[s]uch escrow funds shall not
be subject to attachment by the creditors of either the purchaser or the
• ..[developer]." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.95 (Supp. 1974). Florida au-
thorizes the use of deposits by the developer for construction of the con-
dominium project, provided the sales contract has clearly stamped on its
face the fact that the developer intends to use the deposit for construction.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.67 (Supp. 1975).
9. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 514-14 (1968); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
352-h (McKinney 1968).
10. See Vishny, Financing the Condominium, 1970 ILL. L.F. 181, 187-
93.
11. See Bar Journal 104.
12. See generally Thompson, The Condominium as a Subdivision, 14
HASTINGS L.J. 302 (1963).
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cases and statutory law concerning subdivided land sold to succes-
sive grantors.'3
A. The Right to a Partial Redemption or Partial Release in a
Subdivision
A mortgagor or a party claiming through his interest cannot re-
quire a partial release of the property upon tendering partial repay-
ment of the mortgage indebtedness. 4 The usual remedy available
to an owner of part of the premises faced with a foreclosure would
be to redeem for the full amount of indebtedness and become subro-
gated to the position of the mortgagee.'" The mortgagor has the
additional right to "marshalling" of the property prior to foreclo-
sure.'" The mortgagor and mortgagee, however, may contractually
provide for a partial redemption.' 7
13. Known as "inverse order of alienation," it is a familiar principle of
equity that, in such a case, the parcels in foreclosure are to be sold in
the inverse order of their alienation. 2A WARREN'S WEED, NEW YORK REAL
PROPERTY § 14.18 (1973).
14. Gerber v. Karr, 231 Md. 180, 184-85, 189 A.2d 353, 355 (1963);
Graham v. Linden, 50 N.Y. 547, 550 (1872); see G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES
629 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE]; 4 S. SYMONS, POMEROY'S
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 658 (5th ed. 1941).
15. OSBORNE 630. Ordinarily, the subrogated mortgagor will be able to
compel the giving of an assignment. An argument opposed to the granting
of an assignment under these conditions stems from the fact that the
mortgagor only has a duty to discharge the mortgage upon payment. How-
ever, since the granting of an assignment does not impose any additional
burden on the mortgagee, courts should compel assignments if the mortga-
gor has shown a substantial need for this remedy as opposed to subroga-
tion. Id. at 577.
16. Marshalling is "the ranking or ordering of several estates or parcels
of land for the satisfaction of a judgment or mortgage to which all are
liable." 1 H. BLACK, JUDGMENTS, § 440 (1902). For an exhaustive discussion
of marshalling, see OSBORNE 579-97 & n.38.
17. Courts are split upon whether such contractual provisions should
run with the land or be personal to the mortgagor. See, e.g., Kerschenstei-
ner v. Northern Mich. Land Co., 244 Mich. 403, 221 N.W. 322 (1928)
(run with the land); Gilman v. Forgione, 129 Me. 66, 149 A. 620 (1930)
(personal unless "or his assigns" is included in the provision); Rugg v.
Record, 255 Mass. 247, 151 N.E. 95 (1926) (personal). In considering
whether the contractual provision should be personal it has been suggested
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In many states the construction mortgagee, by joining in the
recordation of the master deed, subordinates the construction mort-
gage to the condominium regime."8 In effect, the mortgagee encum-
bers each and every unit in the condominium. Since the mortgagee
has consented to the subdivision-platting of one project into a con-
dominium regime, an argument can be made that, at least with
regard to payment of the indebtedness, the construction mortgage
should also be viewed as divisible. Indeed, with the creation of a
condominium regime, the method available for the repayment of
the construction loan money is by way of sales of individual units,"
with the proceeds of each sale being used to reduce the indebtedness
of the outstanding mortgage loan by a stated amount." Upon crea-
tion of a condominium regime, the developer and mortgagee could
of course negotiate a partial release2' of individual units.22 Absent
such an agreement, the right to receive an individual unit free and
clear of a construction lien upon payment of the partial release
amount stipulated in the construction loan documents by a contract
purchaser is not possible if the developer defaults.23
that where the subdividing of the tract was contemplated from the creation
of the mortgage such a right to a partial release should run with the land
since "a rule limiting the privilege to the mortgagor will either diminish
considerably the sale value of the property, or result merely in the release
money changing hands twice." 31 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 895 (1931).
18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.08 (1969), as amended, (Supp.
1975).
19. The unit owners of a condominium are personally liable for their
individual debt. This provides flexibility in financing and assures the
mortgagee of payment. The debt is financed separately and the payment
of the construction loan can be made directly by each unit owner. P. ROHAN
& M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.01 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as ROHAN].
20. The amount could be the cost of the unit less the developer's profit.
21. Almost every condominium contract of sale, however, provides for
the subordination of the interest of the unit purchaser to the construction
mortgage.
22. Bar Journal 104.
23. Many prudent lenders insist that the mortgagor is entitled to a
partial release only if a loan is not in default. Whether a court would set
this aside to allow the purchasers a right to have a partial release remains
to be seen.
1975]
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B. Right to a Sale in Parcels
1. Post-Regime
A basic issue is whether foreclosed property should be sold in
parcels or in gross. A Minnesota court, despite a statute that
required separate sales if the property were composed of distinct
areas or tracts, nevertheless found for the mortgagee:
If, at the time of the giving of the mortgage, the mortgaged premises did
not consist of separate and distinct tracts, within the meaning of the statute,
a foreclosure sale of the entire tract as mortgaged would have been rightful,
and not invalid, even though, by reason of a subdivision of the property by
the mortgagor, subsequent to the giving of the mortgage, and an acquisition
of interests by other persons in separate portions of the property, such equi-
ties may have arisen that a court of equity, upon timely application, would
have required the sale to be made in separate parcels."
The inference is that if the subsequent purchasers from the original
mortgagor had made timely objections, the court would have re-
quired the sale to have been made in separate parcels.
In Meador v. Johnson,25 the court held that where a statute re-
quired that sales be made in separate parcels, sales en masse, "are
voidable only and not void.""6 Moreover, in order to set the sales
aside "it must appear that the interests of the debtor have been
sacrificed, or that there was some attending fraud or unfair deal-
ing."2 7
An early California case involved a deed of trust, permitting the
trustee at his option to sell the foreclosed property as a whole or in
parcels.28 Analyzing this provision, the court recognized that the
24. Clark v. Kraker, 51 Minn. 414, 415, 53 N.W. 706, 707 (1892).
25. 27 Okla. 544, 112 P. 1121 (1910).
26. Id. at 551, 112 P. at 1124.
27. Id. at 550-51, 112 P. at 1124.
28. While the equitable relief is the same, the method of pursuing such
relief differs in a judicial foreclosure state from a power of sale state. In
the power of sale state, the trustee of the deed of trust sells the property
in a private sale to the highest bidder, who is normally the construction
lender. However, in many states the sale must be confirmed by a state
court. It is at the confirmation hearing that the aggrieved purchasers would
object to a sale in gross. In other power of sale states after the private sale
an aggrieved party could commence an equity suit for a new sale of prop-
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rights of the debtor and his successors, as well as the mortgagee,
must be protected:
But in the case at bar the parties did not make an absolute stipulation that
the property should be sold as a whole. The provision ... gave the trustees
a discretion to sell as a whole or in parcels. This discretion they were bound
to exercise in good faith for the best interests of their beneficiaries, who
included, not only the creditor, but the debtor and his successors in interest."'
Plaintiff, representing the purchaser of the entire property at the
foreclosure sale, argued that as a condition of setting aside the sale
the defendant mortgagor should pay the entire indebtedness. The
court rejected this argument, stating:
[I]t is certainly not the law that an offer to pay the debt must be made,
where it would be inequitable to exact such offer of the party complaining of
the sale. Under the circumstances . . . the defendant would be subjected
to very evident injustice and hardship if her right to attack the sale were
made dependent upon an offer by her to pay the whole debt. The debt was
not hers, and she was not liable for any part of it.3'
This same reasoning is applicable to the rights of a condominium
purchaser to request a sale in parcels without conditioning that sale
on the ability of a purchaser of a single parcel to pay the entire debt.
Indeed, recent court decisions have strongly leaned towards requir-
ing the sale of foreclosed property in parcels, 31 indicating that the
erty. In a judicial foreclosure state, the foreclosure suit is at its inception
a court action. See OSBORNE 660-742.
29. Humboldt Say. Bank v. McCleverty, 161 Cal. 285, 119 P. 82, 84
(1911).
30. Id. at 285, 119 P. at 84-85.
31. In Champlain Valley Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ladue, 35 App.
Div. 2d 888, 316 N.Y.S.2d 19 (3d Dep't 1970), the court, addressing itself
to an order of a sale in parcels, held: "While the court has the power ...
to order a sale of all the parcels, its equitable powers also include the
power to direct the order of sale of different parcels in order to protect the
rights and preserve the equities of all." Id. at 888, 316 N.Y.S.2d 21. And a
Florida court decided: "It is the rule in Florida that a sale in parcels is
preferred over a sale en masse where the former is practical and equitable
to all parties." Applefield v. Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n., 137 So.
2d 259, 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). In Manhattan Ry. v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 99 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1938), the federal district
court was found to have the power and discretion to direct the sale of only
1975]
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equitable desire to protect the interests of all the parties has not
changed very much."
Where a condominium regime has been established by recorda-
tion of the condominium master deed,33 the court should allow the
property to be sold in parcels, i.e., individual condominium units,
in the event of foreclosure by the construction mortgagee. Such a
sale in parcels should be ordered regardless of what the sales con-
tract or the conditions contained within the mortgage or building
loan agreements set forth. By recording the master deed, the prop-
erty is divided into separate and distinct units. In certain states,34
part of the mortgaged property. A provision in the mortgage which re-
quired the property to be sold as a whole apparently did not apply to fore-
closure. Id. at 792.
32. In Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957 (1956), the Supreme
Court of Idaho took a conservative approach to the question of when a
mortgagee is obligated to sell a tract in parcels. "The general rule is that
where there is no division of the mortgaged property into parcels adapted
for separate and distinct enjoyment, the property should be sold as a
whole, unless the party interested should show in some intelligible manner
the distinct manner in which the property might be profitably divided for
sale." Id. at , 293 P.2d at 960. Jones, in his treatise on mortgages, 3
L. JONES, LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY (8th ed. 1928) [hereinafter
cited as JONES], discusses the right to require a sale in parcels: "When the
mortgage describes the land as one tract, it is said that it is the right of
the mortgagee by the contract to sell the whole of the mortgaged premises
in satisfaction of his debt; but the better opinion would seem to be that
the obligation to sell in lots has reference to the situation of the property
at the time of sale, irrespective of the description in the mortgage." Id. at
918. Elaborating on this point, Jones concluded: "The criterion in all cases
is, What [sic] mode of sale will realize the largest amount of money? If
this object can be obtained by the sale of the whole mortgaged premises
together, that is the proper mode to pursue, even if they are readily divisi-
ble. If the land is divisible into separate parcels, and is better adapted for
use in parcels, then the presumption would seem to be that it would pro-
duce a larger amount of money if sold in that way, and the sale should be
made accordingly." Id. at 918-19.
33. See FHA Model Statute, FHA Form 3285, set out in ROHAN §
7.02[1]. Each state has its own variation. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:8B-9 (Supp. 1975).




the mortgagee is required to join in creation of the condominium
regime by executing the master deed or subordinating the construc-
tion loan lien to the master deed. To allow a mortgagee to foreclose
en masse would be to disregard the very condominium regime cre-
ated.
2. Pre-Regime
Where a condominium regime has been created, can a court in
equity insist upon a sale in parcels, which would necessitate a re-
cording of a condominium regime? There is some case law and sta-
tutory support for such a proposition-albeit in analogous situa-
tions.
[P]roperty should be divisible into parcels beyond any doubt, and ... such
division and sale would produce more advantageous results.3 5
Following this line of reasoning further:
The mere fact that mortgaged property which is divisible is sold as a whole
rather than by parcels is not itself evidence sufficient to justify annulment
of the sale, but in addition to that it must appear that that method of selling
it was prejudicial to the mortgagor, his privies, or creditors, and the burden
of showing that is upon the one attacking the sale."
A Michigan statute provides:
If the mortgaged premises consist of distinct farms, tracts, or lots not occu-
pied as 1 parcel, they shall be sold separately, and no more farms, tracts, or
lots shall be sold than shall be necessary to satisfy the amount due on such
mortgage at the date of the notice of sale, with interest and the cost and
expenses allowed by law but if distinct lots be occupied as 1 parcel, they may
in such case be sold together. 7
In Jerome v. Coffin,3 8 plaintiff purchased property from the defen-
dant mortgagee with the intention of subdividing and selling the
property. Upon default, the court required a sale in parcels, noting
35. Johnson v. Hambleton, 52 Md. 378, 386 (1879).
36. Webster v. Archer, 176 Md. 245, 249, 4 A.2d 434, 438 (1939).
37. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3224 (1968).
38. 243 Mich. 324, 220 N.W. 675 (1928). An early case allowed property
to be sold en masse where it was originally mortgaged as one parcel and
later subdivided without the mortgagee's concurrence. Durm v. Fish, 46
Mich. 312, 9 N.W. 429 (1881).
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that the intention to subdivide was obvious to all including the
defendant."
Although the Michigan statute is unique, similar circumstances
should lead to the same equitable result. In the case of today's
condominium projects, construction lenders are not only aware of
the plans of the mortgagor to create and sell condominium units,
but have treated the project as a condominium 0 from the inception
of the loan. In most cases, the construction lender receives a higher
interest rate because of the inherent risks involved in any condomi-
nium project." While a court in a foreclosure proceeding must care-
fully balance the equities," those equities require that the rights of
subsequent purchasers contemplated by the construction mortgagee
at the inception of the loan be protected. The court should of course
determine whether the mortgagee's interest in the property would
be impaired by requiring creation of the condominium regime. At
first glance it appears that this method enhances the immediate
position of the mortgagee: he realizes a partial reduction in the
outstanding indebtedness upon the sale of units under existing con-
tracts, and nothing prohibits him from renting the unsold units."
39. "That it was bought for that purpose [subdividing] all concede
... . Knowledge that it had been subdivided was, we think, conveyed
• . . in a letter to her from plaintiff in which he speaks of the property as
the Jerome subdivision and says that but very little of the property has
been sold." 243 Mich. at 327, 220 N.W. at 676. The court went on to note
that "[t]wenty-eight of the lots have been sold on contract. Doubtless all
the vendees in such contracts would insist, as interveners insist, that they
have at least a constructive occupancy of the lots so purchased." Id. at 329-
30, 220 N.W. at 677.
40. This is essential as the factors behind making the loan are signifi-
cantly different from those involved in conventional lending. See, e.g., the
checklist for lenders provided in Symposium-Condominium Workshop,
48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 677, 734-35 (1974). See also ROHAN § 9.01[2].
41. See generally RoHAN § 9.01[2], citing a return under adverse cir-
cumstances of 16 percent.
42. In the foreclosure of a mortgage, equity is the primary jurisdiction.
Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U.S. 212 (1888). See OSBORNE 661-63 for the histor-
ical development of the equitable court action to foreclose by judicial sale.
43. One possible reason for not renting units might be deterioration
caused by renters which would affect the subsequent marketability of the
unit as a condominium.
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But what of the value of the remaining security? To require the
creation of a condominium regime might effectively prevent a con-
struction mortgagee from selling the unsold units as a rental prop-
erty to another purchaser since it would be almost impossible to
secure a buyer willing to purchase such property or a lender willing
to finance such a purchase."
While these are valid problems, there are practical, if not com-
pletely satisfactory, solutions. Without question the original choice
of condominium development would have proved most efficient.
Any lessening of value because of an overbuilt market should be
immediate and not long-term. Historically, in overbuilt areas within
a year or a two-year period most unsold units are sold." In the case
of garden apartment condominiums, a condominium regime need
be created for only certain buildings," leaving the mortgagee with
apartments not encumbered by a condominium regime. This can be
accomplished by the expanding condominium concept which is sta-
tutorily authorized in such states as Virginia47 and Maryland.4"
While at first glance such a solution appears impossible for a high-
rise, it is not necessarily the case. With careful planning a solution
is possible. Already, in major cities such as New York and Chicago,
highrise buildings are carved into multi-tiered layers of use and
ownership."
44. Most permanent lenders would look askance at placing a perma-
nent loan on a condominium regime where certain units were owned in fee
simple, separate and apart from the security. There would also be a further
problem as to the rights of the permanent lender in the common areas.
45. For a study of market absorption of condominium units, see Quart-
erly Apartment Rep., Southeast Florida, available from Reinhold P. Wolff,
Economic Research, Inc., P.O. Box 1336, S. Miami, Fla., 33143.
46. See generally, Krasnowrecki, Townhouse Condominiums Com-
pared to Convention Subdivisions with Home Association, 1 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 323 (1973). Condominiums can be included as part of a planned unit
development. See the model plan in ROHAN § 4.03[4].
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.2 (Supp. 1974).
48. MD. ANN. CODE § 11-101 (1974) (Real Property); see ROHAN § 16.03.
49. What is to prevent the top floors of a highrise project being submit-
ted to a condominium reginie with the bottom floors not being encum-
bered? See Frankel & Funk, Real Estate Togetherness-Separately Owned
Buildings in a Single Structure, 27 RECORD OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.
586 (Nov. 1972).
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No mechanical formula can be employed in deciding when to
force subdivision of the property5° so as to allow a sale in parcels.
Courts should carefully review all the facts and not be bound to an
"either/or" situation of allowing a foreclosure en masse or in par-
cels.5 They must balance the equities of all the parties and the
potential effects of the decision. The purchasers of condominium
units anticipated by the construction mortgagee and actively sought
and solicited by the developer have rights-as important as the
mortgagee's-that must be protected in a suit to foreclose. Once this
proposition is accepted, attention can be properly focused upon
more equitable judicial resolution of the problem.
In the real estate and condominium market, no purchaser should
be faced with the loss of down payment because of a seller's
bankruptcy or insolvency. 2 In cases of severe hardship where pur-
chasers changed their position by selling their houses and incurring
moving expenses, a court should strongly consider creating that
which was intended at inception-a condominium. It is one thing
to expect purchasers to accept the fact that they cannot purchase
non-existent or uncompleted condominiums. But where a project is
completed, can purchasers be denied the right to purchase their
units merely because the seller is insolvent and the construction
mortgagee is foreclosing?
IV. Conclusion
This article has attempted to examine a problem existing in many
areas of the country: the large number of unsold condominium units
and the lack of prospective purchasers (to augment the existing
purchasers) prevents a sellout and repayment of existing building
50. This can be achieved, inter alia, by requiring recordation of a con-
dominium regime.
51. One of the leading purposes of a suit to foreclose is to enable the
mortgagee to sell right and title to the property mortgaged. To do this all
claims must be adjusted and all persons beneficially interested should be
made parties to the action. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS & PROCEED-
INGS LAW § 1311(1) (McKinney 1963).
52. This risk is very real. New York requires that the prospectus warn
the purchasers of potential loss, absent an escrow account. Wisner,
Financing the Condominium in New York: The Conventional Mortgage,
31 ALBANY L. REV. 32, 51 (1967).
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loan mortgages. Involved is the protection of the rights of a pur-
chaser, including the right to receive his condominium unit for the
contract price.
With regard to allowing a purchaser the right of a partial redemp-
tion, such a remedy has no historical basis in Anglo-American prop-
erty law.53 Perhaps an argument could be made that, with the crea-
tion of condominium regimes based upon statutory legislation,54 a
right of partial redemption is needed because of some intrinsic fac-
tors55 present in the condominiums; nevertheless, the granting of a
right of partial redemption may be unfair to the construction mort-
gagee whose interests must also be protected by a court in any
foreclosure proceeding. A partial redemption, if permitted, could
consist of a repayment of that portion of the mortgage loan allocated
to a particular unit.56 Such an amount would normally be less than
the selling price of the unit. But if the developer has defaulted or is
bankrupt, and the construction mortgagee is left holding unsold
condominium units, it would be unjust to allow release based on
partial redemptions.
53. The mortgagee creditor can consent to a partial redemption, Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 133 Ill. 368, 27 N.E. 91 (1890), but this is
an exception to the general rule requiring full payment of the mortgage
debt. Graham v. Linden, 50 N.Y. 547, 550 (1872).
54. Whether under common law or statute the instruments creating a
condominium are similar. ROHAN § 3.01.
55. This could be based on the language of the statute. New Jersey
states: "[E]ach unit shall constitute a separate parcel of real property
which may be dealt with by the owner thereof in the same manner as is
otherwise permitted by law for any other parcel of real property." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-4 (Supp. 1975).
56. If a court held for the partial redemption approach, it might con-
sider the release schedule customarily set forth in either the building loan
agreement or mortgage as a basis of such redemption. Such a release
schedule (which is negotiated between the developer and the construction
mortgagee), requires the construction mortgagee to release a unit upon
payment of a stated percentage of the sales price of each particular unit.
Such a release price could be as high as 95 percent of the sales price or as
low as 50 percent, with the balance of the sales proceeds returned to the
developer as profit. The higher the release price the faster a construction
loan is paid off, with the developer receiving most of his profit out of the
last sold units.
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A sale of the whole project upon foreclosure is also not acceptable:
it prevents purchasers from bidding for their respective units. More-
over, a traditional sale in parcels would not protect the rights of the
purchaser, since a sale to the highest bidder could vitiate the origi-
nal purchasers' contracts. To be guaranteed his unit, a purchaser
would have to prevail at the sale."
The fairest approach would be to require the mortgagee to "recog-
nize" the existing contracts and allow those units to be sold to the
purchaser at the contract price. In effect, a mortgagee would fore-
close and take the property subject to the existing contracts. The
sales would then be consummated at the original contract price,
with the mortgagee receiving 100 percent of the purchase price. This
approach should not be limited to cases where the condominium
regime was created prior to the foreclosure. A court should not be
bound by the fact that the condominium regime was not created
because of some condition such as the borrower's failure to meet the
construction lender's pre-sale requirements."8 If the building is com-
plete, with a reasonable number of binding purchase agreements
having been signed, courts should require the recordation of the
condominium regime. 9
In this area of foreclosure law, the courts have rightfully aban-
doned such outmoded and artificial distinctions as whether the legal
description contained in the mortgage was in gross or in parcels, 0
57. The officer in charge of the sale of property must use his discretion
to bring the highest return while acting in the best interest of both the
creditor and the debtor. Humboldt Sav. Bank v. McCleverty, 161 Cal. 285,
119 P. 82 (1911).
58. A condominium is created by the recording of the master deed.
ROHAN § 3.02; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-8 (Supp. 1975). The fact
that a governing body has not been established should not be significant
in determining the interests of the unit owners as the first meeting is
usually at the discretion of the builder. ROHAN § 17.02.
59. Another approach that deserves consideration is the appointment
of a receiver by the court to advertise and sell unsold units. Admittedly,
this represents somewhat of a departure from the traditional duties of a
receiver, to protect, maintain, and operate the property. However, what
better way for a receiver to protect the condominium project than to suc-
cessfully market and sell it?
60. The court determines the amount to be sold. N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS & PROCEEDINGS LAW § 1351(2) (McKinney 1963).
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or whether the construction mortgagee had actual or constructive
knowledge of subsequent subdivision. Similarly, courts dealing with
foreclosures should not be bound by the language set forth in the
sales contracts or mortgage instruments, nor constrained by crea-
tion of the condominium regime rel non. To do so would clearly be
just as artificial a distinction, and hardly serve the interests of jus-
tice.

